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WHY ARE HOUSEHOLDS THAT REPORT THE LOWEST
INCOMES SO WELL-OFF?*
Mike Brewer, Ben Etheridge and Cormac O’Dea
We document that households in the UK with extremely low measured income tend to spend
much more than those with merely moderately low income. This phenomenon is evident
throughout three decades worth of microdata and across different employment states, levels of
education and marital statuses. Of the likely explanations, we provide several arguments that
discount over-reporting of expenditure and argue that under-reporting of income plays the major
role. In particular, by using a dynamic model of consumption and saving, and paying special
attention to poverty dynamics, we show that consumption smoothing cannot explain all the
apparent dissaving.
Economists have consistently argued, on both theoretical and practical grounds, that
having a low level of consumption provides a better measure of poverty than having a
low level of income. On a theoretical level, consumption in any one time period is
more closely aligned with life-time utility than is income, as households with high life-
time resources can borrow to smooth consumption when income is temporarily low
(Poterba, 1989; Cutler and Katz, 1992; Slesnick, 1993). On a practical level, Meyer and
Sullivan (2003) argue that, in US surveys at least, income is more likely than
expenditure (which can proxy for consumption) to be under-reported by those with
the least resources.
Nevertheless, there are obvious reasons why poverty is generally measured using
income. Principally, governments dispense benefits according to income rather than
expenditure, as the latter is more manipulable and harder to monitor. Income
measures are therefore more closely aligned to the mechanisms of government
intervention, and, for good or ill, income measures therefore often guide policy. In the
UK, for example, there are four statutory measures of child poverty against which the
government of the day has to report progress annually (and, ideally, ‘eradicate’ by
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2020–1; see Brewer et al., 2011), all of which define poverty in terms of a low household
income. Similar targets exist across the European Union.
Given that both expenditure-based and income-based poverty measures are
important, it is crucial, therefore, to understand what causes them to diverge (which
they often do): is it the theoretical reasons mentioned above, the practical,
measurement, issues, or some combination of the two? This question is important
because the competing hypotheses have very different implications for economic
analysis. If under-reporting of income is more important, then this implies that poverty
measurement is subject to the vagaries of the survey instrument and that more effort
should be put into survey design and implementation, and that the analyst should
employ statistical techniques to limit the effect of contamination. On the other hand, if
consumption smoothing is more important, then the bottom tail of income recorded
in surveys contains vital information on economic behaviour and shows how important
are stocks of assets, credit markets and other insurance mechanisms to household
welfare.
This article attacks this question by analysing a puzzling and, as we show, pervasive
feature of the distribution of expenditure conditional on income at the bottom of the
income distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the puzzle, using data from the UK Living
Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) to plot non-parametrically the relationship between
median spending given income and median income given spending. Median income is
monotonically increasing in household expenditure but median expenditure for those
with very low income (below £75 per week, or those in the bottom 1% of the income
distribution) is very high relative to income. In fact, those at the very bottom of the
income distribution have a median expenditure equal to the population-median level
of expenditure (roughly £400). From approximately £110 per week (around the
second percentile), median expenditure rises with income. In short, the graph of
median expenditure by reported income contains a sharp non-monotonicity; that is it
maps out a ‘tick’ (for North Americans: a ‘check’). As we show later, this tick has
existed to a greater or lesser extent over time and is evident among different sub-
groups of households.
This pattern could be explained by any combination of under-reporting of income,
over-reporting of expenditure, or that households smooth consumption over time.
This article investigates what role each of these candidates has to play. We argue that
over-reporting of expenditure is unlikely to be playing a large role here, in part
because of evidence from surveys that use a ‘balance edit’ (in which households who
report expenditure far in excess of income are asked to account for the source of their
spending) that low-income households tend to report expenditure levels more
accurately than income, but also because the tick pattern has been shown to exist for
measures of living standards other than consumption. Of under-reporting of income
and consumption smoothing, we provide several pieces of evidence that the former
plays the major role. First, we show that a similar tick exists for households of very
different composition, and remains when we condition on employment status. Given
that most transitions into poverty are between rather than within work status (Altonji
et al., 2013), then conditioning on labour market status should remove most of the
effect of the consumption smoothing channel. Second, a comparison of our microdata
and administrative data strongly suggests that some specific components of income are
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under-recorded. In particular, we find that, as Meyer et al. (2009) show for several
surveys in the US, UK household surveys do not capture anything like the amount of
cash transfer payments which the government reports paying out; we also show that
this under-recording has grown in recent years as a proportion of household income.
Third, we provide indirect evidence that income is under-recorded by analysing the
data through the lens of a dynamic model of consumption and saving. The
methodology here is to specify a model which favours the consumption-smoothing
hypothesis and then to show that it cannot reproduce the tick. The main result of the
simulations is that, even with the most ‘generous’ model (one without borrowing
constraints) only around 60% of the tick can be explained. If we choose less generous
specifications, the fraction comes down: in particular, when borrowing is constrained
(a more realistic setting than the model without borrowing constraints), then only a
small fraction of the tick can be explained.
We are, of course, not the first to highlight the nature of the income-expenditure
relationship at the bottom of the income distribution, nor to discuss the relative merits
of consumption and income for measuring poverty. Many papers (including Sabelhaus
and Groen, 2000; Meyer and Sullivan, 2003, 2008, 2011a,b) examine the income-
expenditure relationship for US data (specifically, for the US Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) survey) but it is reasonable to wonder whether their findings might
reflect some feature of that particular survey instrument. Our first contribution,
therefore, is to provide comprehensive evidence on the existence, size and nature of
the tick using a different survey instrument; one that collects information on both
income and spending in different ways from the CEX. Our second contribution is to
assess whether the observed data is consistent with a model of consumption and saving.
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0 100 200 300 400
M
ed
ia
n 
In
co
m
e 
&
 S
pe
nd
in
g
(S
ee
 L
eg
en
d) 
(£ 
pe
r W
ee
k) 
 Income & Spending (£ per Week) 
500
Median Spending
Median Income
Fig. 1. Median Expenditure by Income, and Median Income by Expenditure
Notes. Data are from 2005 to 2009. Values on the axes are given in equivalised real pounds per
week, expressed in December 2009 prices. Equivalisation is carried out using the modified OECD
equivalence scale. The solid lines in the graph represent smoothed conditional medians and are
generated by performing locally-weighted median regressions. Further details are given in
Section 2. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for the smoothed median.
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This is a similar aim to that pursued by Sabelhaus and Groen (2000): after observing
that the bottom decile of the income distribution in the CEX records expenditure far
above income, they compute average permanent income across decile groups and
argue that the joint distributions of expenditure, current income and permanent
income cannot be reconciled with the permanent income model. We build on this
work by solving explicitly for optimal consumption and specifying an income process
that specifically models low-income shocks. Finally, we also argue that the mismatch
between low income and low spending in household surveys is especially important in
the UK given the continuing use of income-based measures of poverty in national and
European policy debates. Although some mismatch between income and spending at
the bottom of the distribution has been documented before (Saunders et al., 2002;
Attanasio et al., 2006; Brewer et al., 2006), we provide a comprehensive assessment
across all groups on society and using over three decades of micro-data.
The article proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the data in Section 1, we
examine the expenditure tick in detail in Section 2. Section 3 examines the direct
evidence that income is under-recorded at the bottom end of the distribution. In
Section 4 we examine whether consumption smoothing can explain the tick using the
dynamic model. Section 5 concludes.
1. Data
Our main data set is the LCFS (known between 2001 and 2007 as the Expenditure and
Food Survey, and the Family Expenditure Survey before that; we refer to it as the
LCFS). We use data from 1978 to 2009. The LCFS is an annual, nationally-
representative, cross-sectional survey with an annual sample of between 5,000 and
7,000 households. Its primary purpose is to provide data for the calculation of the
commodity weights for the UK’s price indices. It aims to collect a comprehensive
measure of household spending with a two-week diary, in which respondents are asked
to record everything they purchase, supplemented by a questionnaire in which
respondents are asked about any spending on infrequently purchased items over the
past number of months.1 The LCFS is the only nationally-representative UK survey
which contains comprehensive measures of both income and expenditure.
Our aim in this article is to assess the causes of differences between individual
households’ income and expenditure over a particular period and, therefore, it is
important that our measures of both income and expenditure are as broad and
consistent as possible.
Our measure of income is comprehensive: it includes income from employment and
self-employment, state and private pensions, state benefits, assets and allowances from
outside the household. It includes all those cash components included in the measure
of income typically used to measure income poverty in the UK – known as the
‘households below average income’ (HBAI) definition of income. The components
that are included in the HBAI series but not included in our income measure are
imputed or non-cash receipts (such as the value of free TV licences that the elderly
1 The number of months differs by item. For example, respondents are asked to record any spending on
motor vehicles in the past 12 months but any spending on household fuel in the past three months.
© 2017 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2017] A R E LOW E S T I N COM E R E PO R T S CO R R E C T ? F27
receive, the value of housing benefit paid directly to landlords and the value of free-
school meals given to children). As we are interested in comparing flows of cash into a
household with flows of cash out (a quantity that has to equal net saving plus net
measurement error in the two series), we do not include the value of these in-kind
receipts in our measure of income. The horizon over which income receipts are
measured differs by the type of receipt. For earnings, ‘usual’ earnings are recorded. For
most respondents this is their most recent wage or salary payment but is replaced with
the ‘usual’ wage or salary payment if the last payment was deemed by the respondent to
be ‘unusual’. For state pensions, private pensions, and benefits, the most recent receipt
is recorded. For asset income (i.e. interest and dividends), where receipts are likely to
be less frequent, all payments over the previous 12 months are recorded; we convert all
these receipts to weekly quantities.
We derive a measure of spending that records all cash outlays by a household in a
given period. Spending on items that tend to be purchased frequently (e.g. food,
drink, household consumables, petrol) is taken from the diary and spending on items
that are purchased less frequently (e.g. household furnishings and appliances,
household bills, mortgage and rental payments) is taken from responses to the
questionnaire. Our expenditure series can therefore be interpreted as average
(weekly) expenditure in recent months.
Both income and spending are therefore measured over shorter periods than in the
US Consumer Expenditure Survey (which measures income over the previous year and
spending over the previous quarter) and over periods which are more similar to each
other than in that survey but it is not the case that income and spending are collected
for exactly the same period of calendar time, as occurs, for example, in the Canadian
FAMEX/SHS surveys, where survey respondents are asked to recall all income and
spending over the previous 12 months.
Our measures of both income and spending are at the level of the household and
are adjusted for household composition using the modified OECD equivalence scale.2
Using the Retail Prices Index, we express income and expenditure quantities in terms
of real (December 2009) UK pounds per week. The LCFS contains some imputed data
where satisfactory responses were not obtained from respondents. We do not include
households that we know contain imputed data in our sample.
The quality of the LCFS data deserves some discussion. The response rate in the
LCFS at the start of our data period was approximately 70% and has shown a steady
decline to 52% in the most recent year of data (Office for National Statistics, 2014).
These response rates are slightly lower than in the Family Resources Survey (62% in the
most recent year of data: see Department for Work and Pensions, 2013b) – the survey
which is used to calculate the official measures of income poverty in the UK. However,
this difference comes not from large differences in the proportion refusing to
participate but from a greater proportion of households in the intended sample with
whom the survey team for the LCFS fail to make contact.
2 This is usually expressed as giving a weight of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional adult
member or child over the age of 14 and of 0.3 to each younger child. We follow the usual UK practice and re-
base so that a two-adult childless household has a weight of 1, meaning that the scale becomes 0.67 for a
single adult, 0.33 for each extra adult or child aged 14 or more and 0.2 for every child aged under 14.
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One potential concern with the quality of the LCFS data is that, when implied
economy-wide expenditure is calculated and compared to that reported in the UK
National Accounts, the microdata accounts for only approximately two-thirds of
aggregate expenditure totals (Deaton, 2005; Attanasio et al., 2006; Crossley and O’Dea,
2010).3 We therefore might be concerned that expenditure data suffer from their own
under-reporting issues. The LCFS is the only nationally-representative survey that
collects comprehensive data on household budgets and, as such, it is hard to validate
household reports. However, Leicester and Oldfield (2009) compare the expenditure
patterns reported in the LCFS with those observed in a commercial data set (the
Kantar UK Worldpanel, previously known as the TNS UK Worldpanel). The latter data
cover spending on food and groceries and are widely used in industry for market
research. Leicester and Oldfield (2009) find that, for each type of family, levels of
reported spending in the LCFS are higher than those in the Worldpanel.
We discuss the under-recording of expenditure in the microdata relative to the UK
National Accounts further in Section 3. Although this phenomenon does not
undermine the conclusion that we draw in this article (that the very high spending
of those with the lowest incomes represents under-reporting of income to a greater
extent than either over-reporting of spending or consumption smoothing), it is one of
the reasons why, in our conclusion, we do not recommend a complete switch from
using income to expenditure (or consumption) in the measurement of poverty in the
UK.
2. Examining the ‘Tick’
Figure 1 documented the clear pattern that households with the very lowest incomes
have median reported spending associated with households with much higher
incomes: that is, the relationship between reported income and median reported
expenditure has a ‘tick’ pattern. But this pattern does not hold when the series are
reversed: households with very low spending do seem to have very low income. As
Meyer and Sullivan (2011b) argue, the sample of households with a low reported
income in such an analysis has been, in part, selected on having negative measurement
error, so we would expect average dissaving to be biased upwards. However, the levels
of income for those with low recorded spending look more plausible than the levels of
spending for those with low recorded income. This suggests that, amongst these
households, there is more measurement error in income than spending.
Figure 2 shows, by plotting selected quantiles of expenditure by income for
households in the bottom 10% of income, that the tick is not confined to the median
(these profiles and those in the Figures that follow are generated using locally weighted
quantile regressions). The graph also includes a 45-degree line, along which income is
equal to expenditure.4 A large majority of those in the bottom 10% of households are
either dissaving or misreporting either of income or spending; among those reporting
less than £75 per week (the bottom 1%), over 90% of households report values of
3 This is also true of the US and its expenditure survey: see Bee et al. (2012) and Barrett et al. (2013).
4 Tables A1 and A2 in the online Appendix show 95% confidence intervals around the estimates of
quantiles shown in the Figures of this Section at each of the first, second and fifth percentiles of income.
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income and spending that are either misreported or consistent with dissaving. This
graph also includes a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of income (to be read
off the right-hand axis). The profiles turn, so that the relationship between a particular
quantile of expenditure and income becomes positive at points ranging from the first
to the fifth percentile of income. The phenomenon we are discussing, therefore, is
something particular to the very bottom of the income distribution. However, although
those in that part of the income distribution on which we focus represent only a small
share of the whole population, they represent a larger share of those in poverty (for
example, on the relative income measure most commonly used in the UK, 16% of
individuals were deemed to be in poverty in 2011–2: Department for Work and
Pensions, 2013c).
The tick is a robust feature of the data and cannot easily be explained by
demographic factors. Figure 3 divides the sample according to the age at which full-
time education was completed (the household’s education level is taken to be that of
the most educated person in the household) and shows the profile of median reported
spending conditional on reported income: the tick is apparent in each of three
education categories. Figure 4 shows that the pattern appears when we condition on
working-age family types (though it is not evident for pensioners, whose profiles we do
not show in the Figure). Figure 5 shows median real expenditure conditional on real
reported income for five-year periods starting in each of 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000
and 2005. In each of the periods, the tick is evident and its magnitude has been
growing (i.e. median expenditure at the bottom of the reported income distribution
has been growing). This implies some combination of worsening measurement error
(perhaps related to the decline in survey participation) or an increasing ability to
smooth consumption (and it is certainly the case that access to credit has become more
widespread over this over 30-year period).
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Notes. The lines in the graphs represent smoothed conditional quantiles and are generated by
performing locally-weighted quantile regressions. Data described in note to Figure 1.
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Figure 6 shows median expenditure across the income distribution split by work
status. The Figure shows that the tick is evident whether the head of household is
working, is out of work, or is self-employed. Very low-income employees are either
reporting earnings below the minimum wage (and we show in the next Section that
this is not uncommon) or are working few hours per week.5 This Figure provides our
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Fig. 4. Median Expenditure by Family Type (Working-age Households)
Note. See notes to Figure 1.
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Note. See notes to Figure 1.
5 Among individuals in our sample aged over 23 (lower minimum wages apply to younger individuals),
aproximately 60% of employees reporting very low earnings (below £75 per week in gross earnings) are
reporting below-minimum wage levels of earnings, with the remainder all reporting usual hours of work of
not more than 20.
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first piece of evidence that the tick is not explained solely by consumption smoothing:
given that most large temporary fluctuations in income represent moves between
employment states (Altonji et al., 2013), we would expect that, if consumption
smoothing explains all of the tick, it should be substantially less obvious in this Figure
and median expenditure here would be monotonic in income. That the tick remains
implies there is a role for measurement error. As an aside, the Figure also shows that
the spending of very low-income workless households is lower than that of employed
600
700
800
500
400
300
200
100
0
Sp
en
di
ng
0 100 200 300
Income
400 500 600
Employed
Self-employed
Workless
Fig. 6. Median Expenditure by Employment Status
Notes. See notes to Figure 1.
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Notes. Data are for the five years from the year shown in the legend. For other notes, see Figure 1.
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and self-employed households with similarly low incomes, with the latter reporting
substantially higher spending than either of the other two work groups even at middle
incomes. The distinctive difference between the spending patterns of the employed
and the self-employed is highly suggestive of a greater propensity for the self-employed
to under-report their income; this difference has been used directly by Pissarides and
Weber (1989) and Hurst et al. (2014) in the UK and US respectively to estimate the
extent of that under-reporting.
Finally, we have checked and confirmed that where shown, the tick is statistically
significant. We do this using the framework of Chetverikov (2012) which involves
testing, non-parametrically, the monotonicity of the relationship between income and
spending: we reject monotonicity of the relationship at all conventional levels, with
p values always <0.01; further details of the test are given in the online Appendix. We
have also checked the significance of using a simpler parametric test by running a
median regression of reported spending on a set of indicator variables for £50 income
bands: the reported expenditure of those in the lowest income group (£0–£50) is
statistically significantly higher than each of the next seven income groups, represent-
ing households with equivalised reported income of less than £400.
3. Direct Evidence on Mismeasurement of Income and Expenditure at the
Bottom End of the Distribution
In this Section, we provide direct evidence for whether the tick is consistent with
under-recording of income, over-recording of spending, or consumption smoothing
(in this case, running down assets or increasing debt). We present some evidence that
can be used to support or refute these three (not-mutually-exclusive) hypotheses by
comparing data from the LCFS to other sources and reviewing what is known about the
asset holdings of those with low cash incomes and/or outlays in the UK.
3.1. What Evidence is There that Income is Mismeasured?
Table 1 shows the fraction of the amount that the UK government reported that it paid
out in various state benefits (in 2009/10) that is recorded in both the LCFS and the
other main survey used to measure UK’s household income distribution, the Family
Resources Survey. These ‘coverage rates’ are high for the two benefits which are
universal or close to it: child benefit and the basic state pension.6 However, coverage
rates are much lower for the two main means-tested cash benefit programmes (68% for
income support and pension credit and 50% for tax credits) and also low (52%) for
the large category known as ‘other non-contributory benefits’, which mostly comprises
benefits paid to disabled people or those requiring care in their own homes. We
cannot tell with certainty which households in the survey are under-reporting income
from state benefits: although we know which households are reporting receipt of
income from cash benefits, we cannot know for sure which households should be
6 It should be noted that there are legitimate reasons why the fraction captured should be below 100%, as
some benefits are paid to people outside the sampling frame of the LCFS, either because they are outside the
UK, or in the UK but not living in private households.
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reporting income from cash benefits. But it is the means-tested benefits and tax credits,
and benefits linked to ill health or disability, which have especially high under-
reporting rates; better-off households should not, by design, be entitled to these
means-tested benefits or income-related tax credits.
Figure 7 plots trends in the amount of ‘missing’ income from state benefits as a
fraction of total household income in both surveys and shows that the importance of
this missing benefit income has been rising gradually over the past decade even though
the importance of benefit income overall as a share of household income has hardly
changed.7
This issue of under-reporting has received more attention in the US than in the UK:
see, for example, Marquis and Moore (1990) for an early example, Bound et al. (2001)
for a general discussion of this phenomenon and Meyer et al. (2009) for a thorough
investigation across 10 programmes and five US data sets. Marquis and Moore (1990)
investigate the role played by forgetfulness, memory decay, confusion over names,
telescoping, learning to under-report, interviewer effects and proxy responses,
concluding that ‘while these hypotheses give occasional insights into isolated error
problems, they do not provide a fundamental understanding of the error dynamics [in
the Survey of Income and Program Participation]’. Less is known about why UK surveys
also show under-reporting: Lynn et al. (2012) was the first study of linked
Table 1
Coverage in Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) and FRS of Spend on Cash Benefit
Programmes in UK, 2009–10
LCFS FRS
Coverage
Total spend
(£ bn/year) Coverage
Total spend
(£ bn/year)
Tax credits 50% 21,270 66% 26,652
Non-means-tested benefits of which: 85% 116,890 86% 112,673
Retirement pension 95% 66,480
Other non-contrib. 52% 27,970
Child benefit 96% 11,880
Incapacity benefit and ESA 74% 6,670
Maternity pay 119% 1,900
War pensions 33% 1,020
Student support 236% 970
Means-tested benefits of which: 76% 36,710 69% 46,355
Rent rebates and allowances 83% 18,930
Income support 68% 16,580
Jobseekers allowance 80% 1,200
Notes. Total spend reports official estimates of spending on specific programmes, and coverage measures the
fraction of this captured in the survey. Authors’ calculation using: Tables 13 and 14 of Barnard et al. (2011)
and previous versions, Department for Work and Pensions (2013a) and authors’ analysis of Department for
Work and Pensions et al. (2012) and previous years. Population grossing weights are used to give aggregate
estimates. See online Appendix for details.
7 Manipulation of the same data (Tables 13 and 14 in Barnard et al., 2011 and earlier editions) shows that
benefit spending as a share of total household income has risen only very slightly, from 20% to 21%, over the
same period.
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survey-administrative data but it looks at a small number of cases in a different survey
from those used in this article. Balarajan and Collins (2013) summarise the results of
an unpublished study by UK government statisticians that compared administrative
data linked to the Family Resources Survey; they conclude, based on interviews with
survey interviewers and respondents who reported benefit income substantially at odds
with administrative data, that part of the under-reporting is due to respondents’
confusion over the names or purpose of benefit programmes and part is due to
respondents simply not having the information needed to answer questions accurately.
Given the aggregate data available to us, it is not clear whether this low (and declining)
microdata coverage of benefit income is due to differential patterns of non-response to
the surveys that is going uncorrected when grossing weights are calculated, incorrect
item response amongst households who are genuinely receiving benefits, or due to
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Fig. 7. ‘Missing’ Income from Cash Benefits as a Percentage of Total Household Income
Notes. Authors’ calculation using: Tables 13 and 14 of Barnard et al. (2011) and previous versions,
Department for Work and Pensions (2013a) and authors’ analysis of Department for Work and
Pensions et al. (2012) and previous years. Confidence intervals for the estimates derived from the
Family Resources Survey can be found in the online Appendix; the estimates derived from the
Living Costs and Food Survey were taken from published aggregates, and no standard errors or
confidence intervals are available.
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households correctly reporting that they receive benefits but under-reporting the
amounts.
We can also assess whether individuals are reporting wages that are below legal
minima, as there has been a nationally-set, legally-binding, minimum wage in the UK
since 1999. Table 2 shows the fraction of employees aged 23 and over (there are lower
rates for younger workers) whose implicit hourly wage – usual weekly earnings divided
by usual hours – is below the national minimum wage. The proportions (between 6%
and 11%) are substantial, although we cannot tell whether earnings have been under-
reported or hours worked over-reported (in reality, there are some exemptions but
these apply to very few workers, and employers can count the value of some employer-
provided benefits, although employer-provided health insurance is much less common
in the UK than in the US.)
3.2. What Evidence is There that Spending is Mismeasured?
The phenomenon we investigate in this article – the divergence between income and
expenditure for those with the lowest reported income – could, in principle, be driven
by over-reporting of expenditure. We discussed the results of some studies in Section 1
that show that, at an aggregate level expenditure is under-reported relative to
quantities recorded in the National Accounts. However, these analyses of aggregate
spending do not rule out that expenditure is over-reported by some at the bottom of
the income distribution. Direct evidence of misreporting at the bottom of the
distribution has been obtained using the Canadian Survey of Family Expenditures
(FAMEX/SHS). Until 2010, this survey made use of a ‘balance edit’, where participants
are probed for more information if they report annual spending that is more than 20%
different from the sum of net income and net dissaving (the latter of which is directly
recorded in the Canadian data, unlike in the UK). Brzozowski and Crossley (2011)
show that this balance edit substantially reduces apparent dissaving at the bottom of
the reported income distribution; crucially, a comparison of responses before and after
Table 2
Proportion of Employees Aged At Least 23 Reporting
Implied Hourly Earnings Below the Minimum Wage
Year Proportion
2001 6.2
2002 6.3
2003 6.5
2004 7.8
2005 6.8
2006 8.2
2007 8.2
2008 8.7
2009 10.5
Source. Authors’ calculation from the LCFS Implied hourly
earnings calculated by usual gross pay/usual hours.
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the additional ‘balance-edit’ questions show that it corrects under-reporting of income
to a greater extent than under-reporting of expenditure.
More tellingly, Brewer et al. (2009) show, when looking at households with
children in four different household UK surveys, that the tick-shaped pattern
between income and expenditure also exists when using many other measures of, or
proxies for, living standards. This set of measures and proxies are collected in a
variety of different ways and have different conceptual properties; this strongly
suggests that over-recording of spending in the LCFS cannot be the sole explanation
for the expenditure tick.
3.3. What Do We Know about Asset Holdings, Debt and Saving Flows Amongst Households with
Low Reported Income or Spending?
The divergence between income and expenditure could, of course, be explained by
net dissaving (i.e. running down assets or borrowing) among those with the lowest
income. Here we look for direct evidence on whether such dissaving could be
happening.
Unlike the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the US, the LCFS has no direct
measure of net saving flows, so we cannot investigate in detail the extent to which
households whose reported spending far exceeds their reported income are dissaving
or borrowing.8 Indeed, even considering other UK data sources, we have a remarkably
imprecise impression of the stock of net assets held by households with a low reported
income or spending, let alone the net saving flows. Information on net assets is
available in two nationally-representative surveys. One of these, the relatively new
Wealth and Assets Survey, unfortunately lacks comprehensive good quality data on
household income (see Income Annex to Daffin (2009)) and therefore we do not use
it (though more comprehensive income data is to be collected in future waves). The
other of these, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) collects comprehensive
data on income and also has some limited data on assets at regular intervals – most
recently in 2005. Figure 8 plots the relationship between net liquid assets and reported
household income in 2005 and shows that most of those with the lowest reported
incomes have low levels of net assets. We infer from this that the majority of
households whose low reported income is less than their cash outlays will not be
running down savings (as they do not have any) but we cannot rule out that a minority
could be.
If households have access to credit markets, they could, of course, be borrowing to
cover excess of their expenditure over their income. Brewer et al. (2009) investigate
the relationship between a number of proxies for living standards using two
longitudinal surveys (the BHPS and the Families and Children Survey) and show that,
even when income is measured using an average over three consecutive waves, those
with the lowest reported income have living standards that are higher than might be
expected. For the higher living standards to be supported by borrowing over the
8 These data in the US allows Aguiar and Bils (2011), for example, to construct a measure of spending
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey equal to reported income less reported saving.
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medium term (which is our interpretation of this three-year period), the level of access
to credit markets would have to be implausible.
4. Can Consumption Smoothing Explain the Tick?
We now examine the tick using panel data on incomes and a theoretical model of
consumption behaviour. To show that consumption smoothing cannot explain all the
tick we formulate a model that both fits the panel income data prima facie, and has two
features that induce agents at the bottom of the income distribution to have
particularly high consumption: an income process that ascribes all ultra-low income
realisations (i.e. those in the bottom 1%) to be temporary; and very lax borrowing
constraints. We make these choices in order to bias the model in the direction of being
able to reproduce a tick similar to that observed in the data without needing to appeal
to measurement error, and we then show that the model cannot generate a tick of the
size that we showed in Section 2.
Our focus here is the consumption of those with incomes in the bottom 1% of the
population. The rationale for this is illustrated in Figure 9, which replots the data
shown in Figure 5 with differently-scaled axes. This Figure shows, for each five-year
period since 1980, median expenditure conditional on income as a proportion of
median expenditure in the population graphed against income centile for centiles 1 to
8 of the income distribution. It underlines that the particularly high levels of median
expenditure given income are most clearly evident among the bottom 1%, and that the
median consumption of this group is as high or higher than the population – level
median consumption. Although the phenomenon we are investigating – expenditure
being far in excess of reported income – is also evident further up the income
distribution, it is the consumption behaviour of those in the bottom 1% that is a
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particularly salient (and pervasive over time) feature of the data, so in this Section we
focus on this bottom 1% as being ‘unusual’.
4.1. Empirical Evidence on Transitions Into and Out of the Bottom 1%
Our income panel data come from the BHPS and our income concept is the same as
that we use from the LCFS: net equivalised household income. The online Appendix
gives full details of the treatment, including sample selection.
Our first task is to examine the empirical income transitions into and out of the
bottom 1%. Table 3 shows these transitions to and from the remainder of the bottom
decile and the other deciles. The data are split into yearly quantile bands conditional
on decade-of-birth cohort and year. The Table shows that few households move far up
and down the income distribution from year to year. However, it is clear that those with
the very lowest measured incomes show different transitions from the next lowest-
income groups: for example, those in the bottom 1% are much more likely to transit to
each of the top five deciles than those in the 1–10% group. Therefore, on the working
hypothesis that incomes are measured correctly, it seems prima facie possible that those
in the bottom 1% could have higher permanent income than those in the 1–10%
range. This result would yield a tick.
As a first simple way to interpret the data, therefore, we compute permanent
incomes, a proxy for consumption, according to some simple assumptions: that
income evolves as a Markov process according to this transition matrix, that
households are infinitely lived and that they discount future income at 3% per year.9
In addition, we ignore the contribution of wealth in this simple computation of
permanent income. Finally, to fix the levels of income, we take current incomes in
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9 Results are robust to any sensible choice of discount rate.
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2005 and 2006 for households with heads born between 1950 and 1970. With these
assumptions, we can compute permanent income as the annuity income from total
discounted life-time income. We plot this relationship in Figure 10. The Figure does
display a tick but it is very small; on this first simple interpretation, therefore, the tick in
the data cannot be reconciled with consumption-smoothing behaviour.
4.2. An Income and Consumption Model
In order to interpret the data more credibly, we now build a more realistic model of
the income process. We start with a standard model, in which log income is given by
the sum of a persistent component and a transitory component. Such an income
process is known to describe income dynamics well across the bulk of the income
distribution (see Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for a review of the literature in this
area). The model is given by the following:
vt ¼ qvt1 þ ft
~yt ¼ vt þ t
(1)
ft Nð0; r2fÞ
t Nð0; r2 Þ
(2)
Table 3
Empirical Transition Matrix for Income by Decile and for the Bottom Centile
Quantile Group
Time t  1
t
0–1 1–10 10–20 20–30 30–40 40–50 50–60 60–70 70–80 80–90 90–100
0–1 24.84 35.95 9.15 6.54 5.56 5.88 2.94 2.29 0.98 2.29 3.59
(2.47) (2.74) (1.65) (1.41) (1.31) (1.35) (0.97) (0.85) (0.56) (0.85) (1.06)
1–10 3.72 47.98 23.91 9.75 5.34 3.16 1.82 1.17 1.25 0.89 1.01
(0.38) (1.00) (0.86) (0.60) (0.45) (0.35) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20)
10–20 1.20 21.50 39.00 19.41 8.37 4.27 2.75 1.24 1.09 0.74 0.42
(0.20) (0.77) (0.92) (0.74) (0.52) (0.38) (0.31) (0.21) (0.20) (0.16) (0.12)
20–30 0.63 8.08 18.69 34.14 20.44 8.61 4.25 1.97 1.48 0.91 0.81
(0.15) (0.51) (0.73) (0.89) (0.76) (0.53) (0.38) (0.26) (0.23) (0.18) (0.17)
30–40 0.77 4.95 8.29 18.12 30.31 17.84 9.45 4.88 2.92 1.51 0.95
(0.16) (0.41) (0.52) (0.72) (0.86) (0.72) (0.55) (0.40) (0.32) (0.23) (0.18)
40–50 0.53 2.91 5.15 8.27 17.29 31.38 18.64 8.41 4.08 2.20 1.14
(0.14) (0.32) (0.42) (0.52) (0.71) (0.87) (0.73) (0.52) (0.37) (0.28) (0.20)
50–60 0.38 2.24 2.55 4.82 8.12 18.78 29.45 19.47 8.91 3.23 2.06
(0.11) (0.27) (0.29) (0.40) (0.51) (0.72) (0.85) (0.73) (0.53) (0.33) (0.26)
60–70 0.48 1.58 1.75 2.77 4.62 7.74 19.18 32.88 18.77 7.60 2.64
(0.13) (0.23) (0.24) (0.30) (0.39) (0.49) (0.73) (0.87) (0.72) (0.49) (0.30)
70–80 0.38 1.36 1.39 1.64 2.72 3.80 8.01 18.99 36.97 20.07 4.67
(0.12) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.30) (0.36) (0.51) (0.73) (0.90) (0.75) (0.39)
80–90 0.37 0.92 0.71 0.88 1.77 2.55 3.84 6.53 18.44 45.83 18.14
(0.11) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.29) (0.35) (0.46) (0.72) (0.92) (0.71)
90–100 0.43 1.22 1.04 1.04 1.25 1.22 2.08 3.44 4.73 15.76 67.80
(0.12) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) (0.34) (0.40) (0.69) (0.88)
Notes. Rows sum to 100%. Standard errors in parentheses and computed using
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pð1 pÞ=Np , where p is the
relevant probability. See text and online Appendix A.4.1. for details on the computation. Source. BHPS.
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such that ~yt is ‘latent’ log income for the household at time t, composed of a highly
persistent component, vt , and a transitory shock t . The persistent component follows
an AR(1) process with innovation ft which is distributed normally. The parameter of
persistence is q 2 [0,1). The transitory shock is iid and is also distributed normally.
This model as it stands is unsatisfactory because it does not pick up the salient
transitions for the bottom 1%. In fact, it is easy to show that the average life-time
income is monotonically increasing in observed current income in this model,
something that would rule out consumption smoothing as an explanation for the tick,
a priori. We therefore add a specific Markov process for this bottom 1%; this is similar to
the approach taken by Jenkins (2011) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2004). Formally:
yt ¼ lþ ð1 htÞmaxð~yt ;uÞ þ ht y
ht 2 f0; 1g
Prðht ¼ j jht1 ¼ kÞ ¼ pkjð~yt1Þ; ð3Þ
where yt is observed log income, composed of mean income l, and either (truncated)
latent income or a low income draw y < 0 that would put the household in the bottom
1%. We set y such that l + y is the average of the bottom 1% of equivalised incomes
observed in the data. The random draw is governed by the stationary Markov process
ht . We term ht ¼ 1 a poverty shock (as a shorthand for ultra-low realisation of
income).10 When ht ¼ 0, the household receives l þ maxð~yt ;uÞ, where maxð~yt ;uÞ is a
truncated version of latent income with u > y. (This truncation has almost no effect on
the analysis but is necessary to ensure that non-poverty income is always larger than
poverty income, something which is not otherwise guaranteed as the underlying shocks
have an unbounded lower tail.) By making ultra-low realisations of income a purely
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for details.
10 This should not be understood as poverty in the sense used in UK policy, where poverty is most often
thought of as having income below 60% of median income.
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temporary phenomenon, we make smoothing consumption over these realisations easy
for agents, and so this feature of our model favours the finding of a tick in
consumption.
The transition probability from state k to state j (where k and j are binaries indicating
poverty status) is given by pkjð~yt1Þ. We allow the transition probabilities to depend on
latent income because it is noticeable from Table 3 that the entry and exit rates are not
uniform across the top 99%; note that our specification means that each household’s
probability of entering and exiting poverty is evolving constantly as their latent income
changes.
To complete the set-up, we specify a rule for consumption and saving. In the spirit of
Carroll (2009) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), we let consumption evolve as the
solution to the following optimisation problem:
V ðAt ; vt ; t ; htÞ ¼ max
Ct
C1ct =ð1 cÞ þ bEtfV ½ðAt  CtÞR þ Ytþ1; vtþ1; tþ1; htþ1g; (4)
where households choose consumption Ct to maximise life-time (indirect) utility V()
given assets At , underlying persistent income vt , transitory shock t and poverty state ht .
On the right hand side, Yt ¼ expðytÞ is household income, b is the discount factor, and
R is one plus the interest rate.11 When taking the model to data, we use equivalised
income as the input, so the model is best thought of as capturing the consumption
decisions of an equivalised household. Per-period utility is given by the standard
isoelastic function. This utility specification implies that households accumulate
precautionary saving to protect against negative income shocks, including the poverty
shock. It also implies that households have a finite target wealth level as long as bR < 1:
whenever assets get too high, households will want to dissave. Finally, Et denotes the
expectations operator at time t: households know the income model and form rational
expectations over the stochastic processes for the evolution of vt , t and ht given by (1),
(2) and (3).
A critical factor in the ability of households to smooth consumption is the tightness
of borrowing constraints. We therefore investigate the model with two extremes of
constraints. First, to model a lax lending environment, we allow ‘natural’ borrowing
constraints: households are allowed to borrow up to the maximum they would be able
to pay back if they receive the minimum possible income draw in every future period.
At the specified interest rate, the long-term debt limit is 11.9 units of income (where 1
is the average income across society). Second, at the other extreme, we impose strict
no-borrowing constraints. We recognise that each regime is unrealistic but together
they capture the bounds of plausible credit limits, with the no-borrowing case likely to
be closer to the truth.
The choice of consumption model warrants further discussion. The model is in the
spirit of, for example, Carroll (2009), who looks at the consumption responses to
income fluctuations in a dynamic programming model. As such, we focus on income
11 As the model is written, the income concept, Yt , is more commonly interpreted as labour income rather
than total income. Total income would be captured by Yt þ ðAt  Ct Þr where r = R  1. However, we
interpret Yt here as total income, because ðAt  Ct Þr likely also reflects capital gains, which are not included
in the data. The distinction between income concepts is slight and we ignore it for the purposes of
exposition. See the online Appendix for more discussion.
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dynamics as a possible explanation of the tick and abstract from other possibly relevant
factors, such as non-separabilities with leisure. These non-separabilities might be
particularly relevant if low income is caused by unemployment. For example, if those at
the bottom have high leisure, the tick could be explained by leisure and consumption
being complements. However, most studies (Browning and Meghir, 1991; Blundell
et al., 1994) find that consumption and leisure are substitutes. Further, Aguiar and
Hurst (2005) show that by switching from market to home production, those who
acquire more leisure can obtain a given quantity of consumption with less expenditure.
Therefore, if the ultra-low realisations of income are mainly due to unemployment
shocks, then introducing these unemployment states explicitly into the model would
lower the tick and strengthen our argument. Finally, note that we use an infinite
horizon and so abstract from life-cycle considerations such as income growth and
changes to family size. We do this because an infinite horizon is more likely to generate
a tick and because the tick is observed in the data across the whole of working life and
for different groups.
As a final word on methodology, we note that we are using panel data on household
incomes which are likely to be measured with just as much error as the LCFS possibly is.
To emphasise, our approach is to assume as a falsifiable hypothesis that income is
measured correctly and to see if the tick can be reproduced by consumption
smoothing alone.
4.3. Estimation and Calibration
We fit the model to the data in two stages. First, we estimate the parameters of the
income process using the transition matrix. Second, we solve the consumption model
using numerical techniques and calibrate it using relevant moments. Full details are
given in the online Appendix; here we discuss the important and intuitive details.
To fit the income process in the main analysis, we merge the decile groups into
courser quantile groups. The courser transition matrix is given on the left hand side of
Table 4. We adopt a simple and transparent approach to estimation. First, we take
transition probabilities for the poverty shock directly from the matrix. The probabil-
Table 4
Empirical and Fitted Transition Matrices
Empirical Fitted
t  1
t
0–1 1–10 10–20 20–50 50–100 0–1 1–10 10–20 20–50 50–100
0–1 24.8 35.9 9.2 18.0 12.1 0–1 24.8 17.3 11.8 22.8 23.2
1–10 3.7 48.0 23.9 18.2 6.1 1–10 3.7 64.4 21.9 9.8 0.2
10–20 1.2 21.5 39.0 32.1 6.2 10–20 1.2 22.5 33.9 39.9 2.5
20–50 0.6 5.3 10.7 62.2 21.1 20–50 0.6 3.4 13.4 58.2 24.4
50–100 0.4 1.5 1.5 12.8 83.8 50–100 0.4 0.0 0.5 14.7 84.4
Notes. Column and row headers give quantile groups. See online Appendix A.4.2 for more details on
estimation.
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ities of entering the bottom 1% are given by the lower four entries in the first column.
Second, we impose that the probability of remaining in the bottom 1% is constant
across the latent income types and given by the top left-hand entry: 0.248. All that
remains is to estimate the parameters of the underlying latent income process: q, r2f
and r2 . These parameters are not separately identified from the first-order transition
matrix. We therefore fix q = 0.95, in the range of conventional estimates, as discussed
in Meghir and Pistaferri (2011). This leaves r2f and r
2
 , the variances of persistent and
transitory shocks, to identify. We identify the relative magnitudes of these shocks as
follows: letting r2v ¼ r2f=ð1  q2Þ be the long-run, stationary variance of persistent
incomes, note that the total variance of (latent) incomes is given by the sum of r2v and
r2 . We then use the empirical matrix to estimate, by minimum distance, the share of
persistent variance in this total variance: we estimate this to be 0.93 (standard error of
0.006). We later calibrate the overall variance of income shocks when we calibrate the
consumption model. This overall variance and the shares of persistent and transitory
components yield us r2f and r
2
 .
The fitted transition matrix is given on the right-hand side of Table 4. It lines up with
the empirical matrix reasonably well, given that the right hand four columns are
estimated using a single free parameter. If anything, the transitions from the bottom
1% to the top half of the income distribution are more frequent in the fitted model
than in the empirical data (and especially so relative to the transitions of the 1–10%
group to the top half of the income distribution). To the extent that, by overestimating
the latent income (and therefore permanent income) of those in the bottom 1% of the
income distribution, we are overestimating their consumption, this small divergence
between the empirical transition matrix and our fitted matrix will magnify the tick
produced by our simulations.
Having estimated the income process from the transition matrix, we then fit the
consumption model by calibrating the discount factor b and the variance of incomes.
We do this by fitting to the average wealth-to-income ratio and by fitting to the average
consumption of the 1–10% group. The average wealth-to-income ratio is 3.1, a
standard target in the macroeconomics literature (Storesletten et al., 2004). The
consumption of the 1–10% group is approximately 45% of median consumption (see
Figure 9). Full details of the model solution, parametrisation, calibration and
simulation are in the online Appendix. Our results are robust to other sensible
calibrations, some of which are discussed in the online Appendix, and to changing the
variance of incomes. We discuss the model fit when discussing the results, to which we
now turn.
4.4. Results
Figure 11 shows median simulated consumption by income centile for the models with
and without borrowing constraints (the income distribution is the same in both
specifications). There is a tick in consumption under both regimes because the bottom
1% of the income distribution contains a broader mix of skill types than the 1–10%
group. However, if we take as a benchmark from the data that those at the bottom have
consumption equal to median consumption, then even the economy without credit
constraints cannot reproduce all the tick. As a rough calculation using Figure 9 as a
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basis, to reproduce the tick in full, the bottom 1% would need to consume just under
three times as much as the the second percentile (which here consumes just over 35%
of median consumption). Actually, in our most generous model, it consumes only
around twice as much, meaning that it explains around 50% of the tick. The economy
with tight borrowing constraints explains even less of the tick, with the same
calculation revealing that such a regime can explain only around 30% of the tick.
Neither model of borrowing constraints matches the reality of credit markets
perfectly but the model with borrowing constraints is likely to be closer to reality (that a
household could borrow almost 12 times its earnings potential without collateral is
implausible). Furthermore, the distribution of wealth in the model with constraints
much more closely matches the empirical distribution than does the model without
constraints: Figure 12 shows the simulated wealth distribution in both economies,
together with mean financial wealth-to-income ratio calculated using the same data
that is used from Figure 8.
We conclude that consumption smoothing cannot account for all the tick in either
model. This is driven by two factors. First, the bottom 1% does not contain, on average,
households of median productivity level; second, households cannot perfectly smooth
their consumption through a period of low income, even when we specify that the
shocks that induce such low income are temporary.
5. Conclusion
This article analyses a puzzling feature of the joint distribution of income and
expenditure. Although median income is monotonically increasing in household
expenditure, median expenditure is higher for those with very low income than for
those with moderately low income. In fact, those at the very bottom of the income
distribution have expenditure equal to the population-level median expenditure. In
short, the graph of median expenditure by reported income maps out a ‘tick’. This
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pattern could be explained by any combination of under-reporting of income,
over-reporting of expenditure, or that households smooth consumption over time, and
this article investigates what roles each of these candidates has to play. Of the three
(non-mutually exclusive) hypotheses which could explain the tick, we argue that
under-reporting of income plays the most important role.
Our results beg the question of whether expenditure levels, rather than income,
should be the criterion which governments use to determine eligibility for benefits or
to measure poverty. There are two reasons why we would not recommend the use of
expenditure to determine who should receive state benefits or be enrolled in
government programmes. First, the collection of accurate expenditure data is
substantially more difficult and more expensive than income data. Second, it is
possible that our finding – that income is more vulnerable to under-reporting than
expenditure – would not survive if the latter were made the instrument for delivering
poor relief. Indeed, one candidate explanation for our results is that, even though the
statistical authorities do not share households’ responses with other government
authorities, households may feel that their responses to the survey may lead them to
have higher tax bills or reduced entitlement to benefits.
But there is a stronger case for the use of expenditure data in the measurement of
national poverty trends, because our results strongly suggest that a fraction of those
with reported low income are unlikely to have genuinely low resources. However, we do
not suggest, in the UK at least, that poverty should be measured with expenditure data
alone. One obstacle (that can be overcome, but at a financial cost) is the relatively
small sample size of the UK’s LCFS, which at present makes it hard to judge whether
poverty trends are statistically significant or to measure poverty reliably amongst
certain sub-groups. A less readily remediable problem is the concerning (and
increasing) divergence seen in the UK and elsewhere between aggregate consumption
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implied by household budget surveys and that reported as part of National Accounts.
Until it is understood to what extent (if at all) this phenomenon is related to the way
that households in poverty report their spending patterns, we are not prepared to
recommend the exclusive use of expenditure data for poverty measurement. Indeed,
the contribution that expenditure data can make to the measurement of poverty
provides an important reason (over and above the many others that have been
discussed) to understand and resolve the tension between micro and aggregate data on
household spending better. In spite of this, the monitoring of expenditure (or rather,
consumption) poverty as well as income poverty, or their use together, perhaps with
other measures of deprivation in a multidimensional index, would represent an
improvement on the use of income alone, and especially when measuring trends in
extreme poverty.
Finally, our results imply the need for careful and thorough consideration of what
aspect of the survey design causes this mismeasurement of income, and how survey
instruments can better capture income at the bottom of the distribution.
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